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Abstract
A Principal has a set of projects, each having di¤erent benet potentials, and each requiring a basic tech-
nology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from
production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Tech-
nology and time-input choices are expertsprivate decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a
sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine expertspriority on technology choice. Using a lin-
ear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum prots, the Principal implements the rst best by
delegating all decisions to the Partnership.
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1 Introduction
We study a Principal contracting with a group of experts for service or production. The Principal has a set
of projects, each having a di¤erent potential for producing benets. Each project requires one expert to be
responsible for the basic production technology, and the time inputs of all experts. The project potential
determines which expert should provide the basic technology as well as expertstime inputs. Experts observe
projectspotentials, but the Principal does not. They also obtain some motivation benets from service or
production, but expertsmotivation benets are unknown to the Principal. Experts decide on who should
provide the basic technology, and each expert decides on his own time input.
An example will illustrate our study. Suppose the Principal is a payer who contracts with a generalist
physician and a specialist physician to care for a group of chronically ill patients. Patientsillness severities
correspond to the production potentials, and these are observed by the physicians, but unknown to the
payer. Physicians are altruistic, and enjoy utilities from patients receiving medical benets. However, their
altruistic utilities from patientsbenets vary and are private information. Physicians decide on the basic
care setting for each patient. For example, if the illness severity is mild, the generalist takes the role as
the primary provider, so care will be at his private o¢ ce with consultation by the specialist at a hospital;
otherwise, the specialist takes the lead, and the setting will be reversed. The primary-provider decision
corresponds to the basic technology choice. The specialists technology is more advanced but also more
costly than the generalists. After the physicians have decided on the primary provider, they coordinate care
by supplying medical services as a team. These services correspond to expertstime inputs.
Clearly, legal, accounting, and consulting professions have similar information and service structures.
These are also common in construction, engineering, manufacturing, and even home building industries. In
these professions and industries, the physiciansaltruistic motivation in the medical eld can be likened to
professionalism, reputation, or both.
Our model posits two sources of missing information: project potentials and expertsmotivation benets.
When the Principal must delegate production decisions to experts, distortions may result from missing
information and experts misaligned incentives of technology and time-input choices. In this paper we
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show that the Principal can implement the rst best by delegating all decisions to an expert-partnership
organization with a simple linear contract that partially reimburses the total production costs.
Why can the Principal solve all missing-information and misaligned-incentive problems with delegation
and a linear cost contract? The heart of the solution lies in the way experts work together as members of a
Partnership. Our concept of a Partnership consists of the following. First, a Partnership is a budget-neutral
entity, receiving revenues from the Principal and sharing them among member experts. This is a standard
assumption. Second, within the Partnership, experts are symmetrically informed about their motivational
preferences and use this information to construct a sharing rule. Experts work closely together, so it is
natural for them to know each others preferences. Third, a Partnership keeps track of technology decisions
and each experts total time inputs, so the splitting of revenues can be made contingent on the collected
information. This kind of internal accounting system is common in all rms. Finally, a Partnership can
determine a gatekeeping protocol; this determines which among the experts has rst priority to take on a
project as the primary provider. Gatekeeping is common in the healthcare market, but any hierarchical
processing of technology choice by professionals in other markets is similar.
Experts are economic agents, so we assume that each must earn a minimum prot to participate in the
Partnership. The experts also enjoy private motivation benets. In the case of physicians, their altruism is
commonly recognized. In the case of professionals and other workers, the motivation benets may actually
come from future prots or their human-capital investment through their current work. In any case, our
assumption is that these motivational benets are private and cannot be capitalized. In other words, the
Principal cannot extract any motivational benets, but still must respect each experts minimum-prot
constraint.
Given the Principals partial cost-reimbursement contract, for each project, the least motivated experts
maximize their joint surplus by the rst-best technology and time inputs, and also make the minimum prots.
What about more motivated experts? Their higher motivation benets drive them to maximize their joint
surplus by over-utilizing technology and time inputs. However, this will violate expertsminimum-prot
constraints. The Partnership then designs the sharing rule for the more motivated experts to deter over-
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utilization. The sharing rule then satises the binding minimum-prot constraint, and implements the rst
best again. Indeed, the sharing rule stipulates that as an expert becomes more motivated, he receives a
smaller prot from adopting his technology and providing time input. The reduced nancial benet acts
against the stronger motivation benet, so more motivated experts are induced to choose the same rst best
as less motivated experts.
The rst-best implementation is robust to many ways in which a Partnership is organized. In the
basic model, a General Partnership chooses a prot sharing rule and a project gatekeeping protocol to
maximize experts joint surplus. In a Seniority Partnership, one expert contracts with the Principal, and
chooses a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to maximize his own payo¤. The Principal can o¤er a
single contract that implements the rst best whether experts work together in a General Partnership or a
Seniority Partnership.
Results here contrast sharply with the standard solution in the principal-multiagent mechanism design
literature; see Mookherjee (2006) for a comprehensive survey. In the canonical model, a Principal designs
a reward-punishment scheme which induces each agent to report truthfully his private information, then
issues detailed instructions to each agent, and monitors the actions of each agent. We propose an alternative
contracting paradigm. We show that the Principal can implement the rst best by contracting with a
partnership that retains private information and decision-making authority. Even more striking, the Principal
achieves this implementation by a single contract.
Our model suggests that a Principal benets from contracting with an expert organization. Partnerships
can facilitate the match e¢ ciency between projects and expertise. This is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence in professional-service markets. Epstein, Ketcham and Nicholson (2010) investigate obstetric practices
and nd that high-risk patients in group practices match with specialists more often than patients in solo
practices. Furthermore, this improves patientshealth outcomes.
Our analysis has policy bearings for the ongoing health care reform in the United States. As a bedrock of
the reform, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal regulator managing Medicare
and Medicaid has been encouraging health care providers to form Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).
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In the ACO model, CMS contracts with a group of providers. An ACO is entrusted with coordinating patient
care. This often requires sharing of information, consultation, and referrals between physicians within an
ACO. Our model predicts that ACOs achieve a higher e¢ ciency and a better care quality if they are paid
by a mixture of capitation and cost-sharing contracts rather than by either pure capitation or pure fee-for-
service. Cost sharing between clients and service providers is also gaining popularity in the legal profession,
which traditionally has billed by hours.1
The paper belongs to the large principal-multiagent literature.2 The more recent literature has recognized
that agents often have diverse interests. Agents may be either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated in their
e¤ort choices or use of private information; see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Benábou and Tirole
(2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000), Khalil, Kim and Lawarrée (2013), Makris and Siciliani
(2013), Murdock (2002), Prendergast (2007, 2008). This literature generally studies interaction between
motivations and nancial incentives. However, these papers assume that agentsmotivational preferences
are common knowledge.
In our paper, the Principal does not know expertsmotivation. As far as we know, in an agency context,
the missing motivation information assumption has only been studied by Choné and Ma (2011), Delfgaauw
and Dur (2007, 2008), Jack (2005), and Liu and Ma (2013). All these show that missing information about
an agents motivation may lead to distortion, so they study second-best incentive contracts. However, all
these models consider only a single agent, whereas here we have many agents, who are assumed to know
about each others motivation.
In Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004), an
organization may consolidate many agents hidden information of productivity, which may be used by a
Principal to prescribe production plans. These papers show that a Principal can benet from contracting
with an informed organization when agentsinputs are complementary, but not when inputs are substitutes.
1Using Alternative Fee Arrangements to Increase New Business,, Bloomberg Law,
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/using-alternative-fee-arrangements-to-increase-new-
business/
2Early contributions include Demski and Sappington (1984), Holmström (1982), Ma (1988), and Mookherjee
(1984). The 30-plus years of literature is extensive, so any proper summary is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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In our model, expertstechnologies are substitutes, but their time inputs are complements. However, the
Principal can still implement the rst best by delegating all production decisions to the Partnership.
Garicano and Santos (2004) and Grassi and Ma (2016) study experts referrals under asymmetric in-
formation. Referrals in these papers are formally similar to expert gatekeeping in ours. In both papers,
referrals lead to ine¢ ciency because of adverse selection. Gatekeeping in our model is performed under
complete information by motivated experts. We allow the Partnership to determine the equilibrium gate-
keeping protocol, whereas in Garicano and Santos (2004) equilibria are derived under di¤erent given referral
protocols.
The economics literature on Partnership is extensive; see, for example, Holmström (1982), Legros and
Matthews (1993), Levin and Tadelis (2005), and Strausz (1999). The usual setup does not consider a Principal
contracting with a Partnership. Rather, a Partnership consists of members who have joint ownership. A
sharing rule that splits revenues among partners is a scheme to incentivize costly e¤orts. We go one step
further and study how a Principal can inuence a Partnerships choices. Furthermore, our concept of a
Partnership includes the gatekeeping protocol, which has not been considered in the earlier literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents technologies and the rst best. Section 3
denes the Partnerships internal organization and the Principals contract. Section 4 studies Partnership
surplus maximization under minimum-prot constraints. Section 5 shows how sharing rules and gatekeeping
protocols implement Partnership surplus maximization and the rst best simultaneously. In Section 6, one
expert becomes a senior partner, and sets up sharing rules and gatekeeping protocols. We show how the
Principal continues to implement the rst best. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions. The Appendix
contains proofs of results.
2 Principal and expert services
A Principal has a continuum of production projects with a total mass normalized at one. Projects are dened
by a benet index, b, a random variable distributed on a strictly positive support [b; b] with distribution F
and density f . The term project bmeans a project with benet index b. For production, the Principal
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needs services from two experts; we call them Expert 1 and Expert 2.
Each expert is identied by his production function that requires both expertsinputs, which can be each
experts time spent on the project. Expert js production function is dened by Rj : <2+ ! <+, j = 1; 2,
where Rj is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. For each project, at most one expert will be
chosen as the primary provider. The output or revenue when Expert j is the primary provider and when
Experts 1 and 2, respectively, spend times t1j and t2j on project b is Rj(t1j ; t2j)b, j = 1; 2. (For the time
input tij , the rst subscript i indicates the identity of the expert who supplies the time, whereas the second
subscript j indicates the identity of the primary provider.) Expert 2s production function generates more
revenue from the same time inputs, and we will expand on the properties of Rj below. The technology costs
of Experts 1 and 2 taking on the role of the primary provider are c1 and c2, respectively, with 0 < c1 < c2, so
Expert 2 has a higher technology cost than Expert 1. We assume that experts have identical and constant
per-unit time cost.3 We also ignore any capacity constraint, so impose no limits on the number of projects
for which an expert can serve as the primary provider, or on the amount of time an expert can spend on a
project.
In the Introduction, we have already provided an example in the health industry. There, the generalist
physician is Expert 1, and the specialist physician is Expert 2. In other industries, junior lawyers, contractors,
and manufacturers take on roles as Expert 1, whereas senior lawyers, architects, and product designers take
on roles as Expert 2.
2.1 Complete Information
We rst consider the Principals optimal allocation when each projects benet index b and the experts
actions can be observed by the Principal. The Principal now can dictate the primary-provider assignment
and time inputs for each project for maximum surplus. Suppose that Expert j is the primary provider, and
Expert i spends time tij on project b, i; j = 1; 2. The surplus is Rj(t1j ; t2j)b   cj   t1j   t2j . Let Vj(b) be
3We can let expertsunit time costs be di¤erent, expertstime costs be increasing and strictly convex, or both.
In either case, there will just be more notation, but no conceptual consequence.
6
the Principals maximum surplus from project b when Expert j is the primary provider:
Vj(b)  Rj(t1j(b); t2j(b))b  cj   t1j(b)  t2j(b); (1)
where (t1j(b); t

2j(b))  argmax
t1j ;t2j
Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  cj   t1j   t2j (2)
are the optimal times experts should supply to project b when Expert j is the primary provider.4
For any (t1; t2), we assume that R1(t1; t2) and R2(t1; t2) satisfy
R2(t1; t2) > R1(t1; t2) (3)
@2Ri(t1; t2)
@t1@t2
 0, i = 1; 2 (4)
R2(t
0
1; t
0
2) R2(t1; t2) > R1(t01; t02) R1(t1; t2), if (t01; t02)  (t1; t2) and (t01; t02) 6= (t1; t2): (5)
Expert 1s technology is less powerful than Expert 2s. At any time inputs (t1; t2), Expert 1s technology
will generate less output (condition in (3)). Given the assumption on the expertstechnology costs, c1 < c2,
it is uninteresting to assume that Expert 1s technology is more powerful. Furthermore, the two experts
time inputs exhibit complementarity (condition (4)). Finally, the production functions R1 and R2 exhibit
increasing di¤erences (condition (5)). These assumptions allow us to derive useful comparative-static results
(see Lemma 1).
An allocation assigns, for each project b, the identity of the primary provider, either Expert 1, Expert
2, or none at all, and the time each expert spends on the project if a primary provider is assigned to it.
Projects without a primary provider will not be serviced. The Principals optimal allocation maximizes its
surplus at each b, i.e., maxf0; V1(b); V2(b)g b 2 [b; b], and we call this the rst best.5
We rst present some properties of the optimal times tij(b) and the surplus functions Vj(b).
4Welfare benchmarks in the literature of motivated agents (see Choné and Ma (2011), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007,
2008), Jack (2005), and Liu and Ma (2013)) do not include the motivation benet in the principals or social planners
objective function because it would have been a form of double counting (see, for example, Hammond (1987) and
Milgrom (1993)). Motivation benets are dened below.
5There is a continuum of projects, so all the optimality results refer to pointwise optimization at any b. The
denitions of surplus, allocation, and the rst best refer to any subset of projects with a positive measure. The same
applies to Partnerships surplus and its own optimization. All our results apply to a discrete model when there are
a xed number of projects.
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Figure 1: First best
Lemma 1 The optimal times tij(b) are increasing in b, i; j = 1; 2, and at each b, t

i1(b) < t

i2(b), i = 1; 2.
Furthermore, the surplus functions Vj(b) when Expert j is the primary provider are both increasing in b, and
V 01(b) < V
0
2(b) for all b. The surplus functions Vj(b) are convex.
Lemma 1 says that each experts optimal time input increases when the project has a higher benet
index b, and when the primary provider has a more powerful technology. These results stem from production
complementary and increasing di¤erences, respectively, (4) and (5). Also, because Expert 1s technology is
less powerful than Expert 2s, the surplus from Expert 1 acting as the primary provider, V1(b), increases at
a lower rate than if Expert 2 acts as the primary provider, V2(b).
The rst best may prescribe Expert 1 to be the primary provider for some projects, and Expert 2 for
others. Or, it may prescribe only one expert to be the primary provider. Clearly, the rst-best allocation
in which each expert is the primary provider for some projects is more interesting. To ensure this, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There are two benet thresholds, b1 and b

2, such that
V1(b

1) = 0 and V1(b

2) = V2(b

2); and b < b

1 < b

2 < b: (6)
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Under this assumption, in the rst best i) if b  b < b1, the project is not serviced, ii) if b1  b < b2,
Expert 1 is the primary provider, and iii) if b2  b  b, Expert 2 is the primary provider, (each expert
also putting in the corresponding optimal time tij(b) i; j = 1; 2, for each serviced project). An example of
surplus-function conguration satisfying Assumption 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. For given revenue functions
Rjs in (1) the assumption is satised when the xed cost c1 is small enough and c2 is not much larger than
c1. In any case, for revenue functions Rj and costs cj , (6) in Assumption 1 is equivalent to6
V2(b) < V1(b) < 0 < V1(b) < V2(b) and V1(b1) = 0) V2(b1) < 0:
When Assumption 1 is violated, in the rst best one expert will not be a primary provider for any project.
In these cases, the surplus function V2 may lie entirely above V1, or it may be entirely below. Expert 1 would
be dominated if b1 = b

2, where V1(b

1) = 0, so in Figure 1, the part of V1 that is above V2 vanishes. Expert
2 would be dominated if b2 = b, so in Figure 1, the part of V2 that is above V1 disappears. However,
our implementation results are robust to surplus-function congurations that violate Assumption 1, and we
discuss these cases at the end of Section 4.
3 Motivated experts
We now describe the expertspreferences. Each expert enjoys motivation utility proportional to the output.
If the output from using Expert js technology for project b is Rjb, Expert 1 and Expert 2, respectively,
receive utilities 1Rjb and 2Rjb. Here, the parameters 1 and 2 are, respectively, Expert 1s and Expert
2s degrees of motivation, which are distributed on strictly positive supports [1; 1] and [2; 2]. (We do
not need notation for distributions and densities.) Motivation parameters interacting linearly with revenues
is a common assumption and makes our analysis tractable.7
The motivation utilities can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic utilities are enjoyments from work. For
instance, physicians are altruistic towards their patients. Here, the output Rjb represents a patients treat-
6First, because V1(b) < 0 < V1(b), by the continuity of V1 there exists b < b1 < b at which V1(b1) = 0. We set
this b1 to b1 in Assumption 1. Second, because V2(b

1) < 0 = V1(b

1) and V1(b) < V2(b), by the continuity of V2 there
exists b1 < b

2 < b at which V1(b

2) = V2(b

2).
7Obviously, the use of a single parameter is without loss of generality. If Expert is motivation is gi(i), where gi
is a continuous and increasing function, we will just redene gi(i) as the degree of motivation.
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ment benet. The technologies R1 and R2 are the available medical services. Both physicians spend time
with the patient, so each enjoys some utility. As another example, two lawyers working on a pro bono case
enjoy providing public services. Extrinsic utilities refer to potential future earnings from work done with the
Principal. A better outcome with the current Principal may bring in more businesses to each expert in the
future. Hence, the motivation utilities may indicate the present values of these future returns.
In any case, utilities from motivation are to be distinguished from the monetary payo¤s (prots) experts
receive. Intrinsic or extrinsic utilities 1Rjb and 2Rjb do not count toward monetary prot. In the case of
1Rjb and 2Rjb representing enjoyment (intrinsic benets), this is a natural interpretation. In the case of
1Rjb and 2Rjb representing future earnings (extrinsic benets), this means that experts cannot borrow
against them, which is also natural. We assume that any monetary payo¤ will add onto the motivation
utility in an additive way.
Each expert must attain a reservation utility; this is a constraint universally adopted in agency problems.
Suppose that Expert js motivation parameter is j , j = 1; 2 and the (total) output turns out to be Q, his
motivation utility will be jQ. If he also earns prot j , his total utility is jQ + j . If the reservation
utility is U j , the expert does not participate unless jQ+ j  U j . In addition, Expert j may earn a prot
j if he does not participate. Because motivation utilities cannot be capitalized, for participation Expert js
payo¤ and prot must satisfy jQ+ j  U j and j  j .
Following Liu and Ma (2013), Makris (2009), Makris and Siciliani (2013), and Olivella and Siciliani
(2017), we assume that j  j is the only relevant constraint, so jQ + j  U j is slack. E¤ectively, we
assume that the reservation utility level U j is not much higher than the minimum prot j . The justication
is simply that the experts outside option rarely o¤ers motivation utility; most jobs merely earn an expert
the minimum prot.8 Furthermore, an expert considering contracting with the Principal obviously favors the
Principals projects over alternatives. That indicates a better motivation-utility prospect from the Principals
8For instance, lawyers contracting with labor unions may enjoy motivation benets from negotiating for better
wage and working conditions, but they are less likely to receive motivation benet from contracting with private
business. Similarly, architects receive motivation benets from working for the public good by contracting with the
government but may not receive motivation benet from working on a private project. The reservation utility U j is
just the prots j an expert earns elsewhere.
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projects than those elsewhere.
3.1 Partnership, budget, and information
The rst best requires, for each project, assigning an expert to be the primary provider, and each experts
optimal time given the primary provider. However, the Principal only knows the project benet distribution
and the range of the expertsmotivation parameters but not their actual values. Moreover, the Principal
can only verify the total cost (technology and time costs) incurred by the two experts after production. The
Principal must delegate all the production decisions to the experts and compensate them according to the
total cost. Nevertheless, experts work together, so they may be able to share information and incentivize
the primary-provider assignment as well as time inputs. We model the work relationship between experts as
a Partnership.
A Partnership is a ctitious player with preferences equal to the sum of the expertspayo¤s. In addition,
we restrict or empower a Partnership in three ways. First, a Partnership does not receive any new revenue
other than what the Principal pays the experts, and it cannot dispose of received revenues other than through
the experts. A Partnership must split revenues by way of a sharing rule, to be dened below. Second, a
Partnership has information of each experts degree of motivation, 1 and 2, as well as records of how many
projects each expert has served as the primary provider, and each experts total cost (technology and time
costs). The information can be used in setting up a sharing rule. Third, the Partnership can decide which
of the two experts is a gatekeeper. The gatekeeping protocol is described next, in Stages 2 and 3 of the
extensive form.
3.2 Gatekeeping protocol and extensive form
The Partnership decentralizes the primary-provider assignment and time inputs in the following extensive
form. Certain details in the extensive form such as the Principals contract and the Partnership sharing rule
will be dened later.
Stage 0 Nature draws the benet indexes of the Principals continuum of projects according to distribution
F . Nature draws Expert js motivation parameter according to some distribution on [j ; j ], j = 1; 2.
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Realizations of benet indexes and motivation parameters are unknown to the Principal. The experts
motivation parameters are common knowledge among the experts. The Principal o¤ers a contract to
the Partnership.
Stage 1 If the Partnership rejects the contract, the game ends. If the Partnership accepts the Principals
contract, it selects an expert, say Expert i, i = 1; 2, to be the gatekeeper, and sets up a sharing rule
to maximize the expertsjoint payo¤ subject to minimum prots.
Stage 2 For each project, gatekeeper Expert i observes the benet index b and decides whether to abandon
the project, become the primary provider, or let Expert j, j = 1; 2 and j 6= i, take his turn.
Stage 3 If gatekeeper Expert i passes on a project to Expert j for the primary-provider decision, Expert
j observes the benet index, and decides whether to abandon the project or become the primary
provider.
Stage 4 Knowing the benet index, the two experts simultaneously choose the time inputs for each project
that has a primary provider. The technology costs and time costs are incurred. The Partnership will
be paid by the Principal according to the contract, and the experts will split prot according to the
sharing rule.
3.3 Principals contract and Partnership sharing rule
The Principal can verify the Partnerships total cost. Although complicated cost-sharing contracts can be
used, we consider a simple, quasi-linear contract ( ; s) which consists of a lump sum   and species that
the Partnership is responsible for a fraction s, 0  s  1, of the total cost.9 Let C1 and C2 be the total
technology and time costs incurred by Experts 1 and 2, respectively. The Principals contract pays the
Partnership a total of   + (1   s)(C1 + C2). We use the accounting rule that the Partnership bears the
expertstotal production costs. After subtracting costs, the Partnership nets    s(C1 + C2).
9The Principals strategy set can be expanded to include a recommendation besides the contract ( ; s). The
recommendation is simply the Partnerships equilibrium gatekeeping protocol and sharing rule (to be derived in
Section 5 for the Principals optimal contract). By denition, the Partnership will play the recommendation. However,
this would require more notation, so we have not included it.
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Experts have more information than the Principal. They know each others motivation parameters, the
total cost incurred by each expert, and the mass of projects for which an expert acts as the primary provider.
Experts use this information to design a prot sharing rule. Let i(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2), i = 1; 2 denote
the payment to Expert i, where M1 and M2 are the masses of projects for which Expert 1 and 2 are,
respectively, primary providers. A sharing rule is dened by the pair (1; 2) such that for any M1, M2, C1,
C2, 1, and 2, with 0 M1 +M2  1,
   s(C1 + C2) = 1(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) + 2(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2): (7)
On the left-hand side of (7), payments from the Principal are independent of the motivation parameters and
how the total cost is generated. On the right-hand side of (7), the split of the Principals payments may
depend on each experts service decisions, but the split must always be equal to the net payment from the
Principals. Expert is prot is i(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2), and his payo¤ is his prot together with the total
motivation benet.
4 Optimal contract and Partnership surplus
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, in this section, we study an auxiliary game which has only two
stages. Stage 0 is the same as the extensive form in Subsection 3.2. In Stage 1, if the Partnership accepts
the contract, it chooses an allocation to maximize its surplus subject to the Partnerships minimum-prot
constraint, which is also the participation constraint. An allocation species which expert, if any, is the
primary provider of each project b, and each experts time input at every b, and experts simply execute
the chosen allocation. The Partnerships maximum surplus in the auxiliary game is the upper bound of its
surplus in the extensive form game in Subsection 3.2. This is because experts are obedient in the auxiliary
game but need to be incentivized in the extensive form game.
Second, in the following section, we study the expertsincentives when the Partnership cannot dictate
their actions. We will show that the Partnership can achieve its maximum surplus as in the auxiliary game
by selecting an expert to be a gatekeeper and writing a sharing rule to align expertsincentives.
We dene a Partnerships degree of motivation as the sum of those of the experts, namely   1 + 2.
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We will use the term Partnership  to denote a Partnership with degree of motivation . Given the
Principals contract ( ; s), we dene
Wj(b; ; s)  max
t1j ;t2j
Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  s[cj + t1j + t2j ] (8)
to be Partnership s surplus (gross of the transfer  ) when Expert j is the primary provider for project
b, and when Expert i with motivation parameter i puts in time input tij , i; j = 1; 2. For project b, the
Partnerships maximum surplus is maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g.
We begin with the relationship between the rst best and Partnership surplus. In fact, the Partnership
surplus function Wj in (8) is isomorphic to the rst-best surplus function Vj dened in (1) because
Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  s[cj + t1j + t2j ]
= s
n
Rj(t1j ; t2j)
h
s
i
b  cj   t1j   t2j
o
;
so the optimal times for maximizing (8) are tij
h
s
i
b

from (2). Therefore, we have
Wj(b; ; s) = sVj
h
s
i
b

: (9)
It follows that Lemma 1 applies to (8). Partnership s maximum surplus ismaxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g =
smaxf0; V1
h
s
i
b

; V2
h
s
i
b

g at benet index b. For an arbitrary contract ( ; s), Partnership s surplus
gross of transfer   is proportional to the Principals surplus with the project benet index b modied toh
s
i
b.
We consider one particular Principals contract. We will show that under this contract, any Partnership
 chooses the rst best for maximum surplus under the minimum-prot constraint. This contract is ( ; s):
  = 
"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
+ 1 + 2;
(10)
s =   1 + 2:
The contract says that a Partnership bears a fraction s =   1 + 2 of its cost, this fraction being the
minimum motivation among all Partnerships; the transfer is its unreimbursed total cost at the rst-best
allocation and the minimum prots.
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We have usedWj(b; ; s) in (8) to denote Partnership surplus when Expert j is the primary provider, and
the maximum Partnership surplus is maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g for project b. However, this Partnership
surplus has not considered the minimum-prot constraint. To do that, we use the following modication.
Dene assignment functions i : [b; b] ! [0; 1], i = 1; 2, each of these functions setting a probability that
Expert i is to be the primary provider for project b. We impose the restriction 0  1(b) +2(b)  1. Given
the contract ( ; s), Partnership  chooses assignment functions i(b), and time inputs tij(b), i; j = 1; 2 to
maximize:
  +
Z b
b
1(b) [R1(t11(b); t21(b))b  sfc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g] f(b)db
+
Z b
b
2(b)[R2(t12(b); t22(b))b  sfc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g]f(b)db (11)
subject to the minimum-prot constraint
    s
"Z b
b
f1(b) [c1 + t11(b) + t21(b)] + 2(b) [c2 + t12(b) + t22(b)]g f(b)db
#
 1 + 2. (12)
Our rst result describes the surplus of the least motivated Partnership.
Lemma 2 Given the contract ( ; s), the least motivated Partnership   1 + 2 maximizes its total
surplus and makes the minimum prot 1 + 2 by choosing the rst-best allocation.
From (9), Partnership surplus is isomorphic to the Principals surplus. However, a Partnership consists
of experts who have di¤erent degrees of motivation. The contract ( ; s) makes Partnership  internalize
the Principals surplus. Partnership  values the output at Rj (where Rj is the production function when
Expert j is the primary provider), so the Principals contract makes Partnership  bear s =  of the
total cost. Then the lump sum   makes sure that Partnership  makes the .minimum prots. Lemma
2 simply says that the least motivated Partnerships surplus is maximized by the rst best. How about
other Partnerships with higher motivation  2 (; ]? The next lemma says that for these Partnerships, the
minimum-prot constraint must bind.
Lemma 3 Given the contract ( ; s), the minimum-prot constraint (12) binds for each Partnership  > .
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Facing the same cost-share rate s = , a Partnership values outputs more when its degree of motivation
increases. In fact, if the minimum-prot constraint (12) does not bind, Partnership  >  must respond by
serving more projects and investing more time inputs, and consequently making less prot.
Next, because the minimum-prot constraint (12) must bind, we write the objective function (11) as

Z b
b
f1(b)R1(t11(b); t21(b))b+ 2(b)R2(t12(b); t22(b))bg f(b)db+ 1 + 2: (13)
Partnership  chooses i and tij , i; j = 1; 2 to maximize (13) subject to the minimum-prot constraint
(12), which, we emphasize, is independent of . Obviously, an allocation is a solution of Partnership s
maximization of (13) subject to the binding constraint (12) if and only if it is a solution of Partnership bs
maximization of
b Z b
b
f1(b)R1(t11(b); t21(b))b+ 2(b)R2(t12(b); t22(b))bg f(b)db+ 1 + 2
subject to the same binding constraint (12), any  and b. But we know that at  = , the rst best
maximizes the Partnerships surplus and the minimum-prot constraint binds. Lemma 3 says that the
minimum-prot constraint of any Partnership b with b >  must also bind, so we have our main result in
this section (proof omitted):
Proposition 1 Given the contract ( ; s), a Partnership of any degree of motivation   1+2 maximizes
the Partnership total surplus and makes the minimum prots by choosing the rst-best allocation.
Proposition 1 says that, under the contract ( ; s), the rst-best allocation maximizes the surplus of
all Partnerships  subject to the minimum-prot constraint. It is a striking result, yet is based simply on
monotonicity. Higher motivation encourages more service provisions and time inputs. Each Partnership,
however, must respect the minimum-prot constraint. When the least motivated Partnership just breaks
even, a more motivated Partnership must nd the minimum-prot constraint binding.
To close this section, we document the changes in the Principals contract when Assumption 1 is violated.
Then we have the two cases that are described at the end of Subsection 2.1. First, when the surplus function
V1 is dominated by V2, we replace b1 by b

2 (where V2(b

2) = 0) in (10). Second, when the surplus function
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V2 is dominated by V1, we replace b2 by b for the contract in (10). All results in this section remain valid
after these changes. When one expert is never the primary provider for any projects, replacing b1 by b

2 or
b2 by b are all that are needed for adjusting the sharing rules for implementation.
5 Partnership sharing rule and implementation
By Proposition 1, if a Partnership could dictate expertsactions upon accepting the Principals contract,
it would prescribe the rst-best allocation and achieve the rst-best payo¤. The Partnership, however, can
only choose a gatekeeper and a sharing rule in the extensive form in Subsection 3.2. Consider a subgame
starting at Stage 2, dened by a gatekeeper and a sharing rule. Suppose that this subgame has a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium rst-best outcome with the Partnership making the minimum prots. Then
any equilibrium of the extensive form must also be rst best. In the next two subsections, we construct such
a subgame, in which Expert 1 is the gatekeeper. There may well be other subgames that achieve the rst
best. In these other subgames, Expert 2 is the gatekeeper; we will come to these equilibria later.
5.1 Gatekeeper Expert 1 and sharing rule
The Principals contract ( ; s) pays a lump sum   and (1  s) of the total cost. A sharing rule splits the
net revenue between the experts in terms of (M1;M2; C1; C2), where Mi, i = 1; 2, are the masses of projects
for which Expert i is the primary provider, and where Ci are Expert is total technology and time costs. The
sharing rule must also be budget balanced, as in (7). Expertspreferences are common knowledge within
the Partnership and their motivation parameters are used in the sharing rule.
Suppose that in Stage 1 the Partnership decides that Expert 1 is the gatekeeper (so Expert 1 gets priority
to decide how projects are to be processed in Stage 2, while Expert 2 only gets his turn in Stage 3). We
construct a budget-balanced sharing rule that implements the rst best:
1(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) =   1C1 + 2C2   sC2   1M1 + 2M2 (14)
2(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) =  
   + 1C1   sC1   2C2 + 1M1   2M2; (15)
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where
1  (1 + 2   s)t21(b1) (16)
2  2V2(b2) + (1 + 2   s)t12(b2); (17)
b1 and b

2 are the rst-best thresholds, and  is some constant.
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The sharing rule requires more information than the Principals contract (which is based only on the
total costs), but is quasi-linear (same as the Principals contract). First, the sharing rule depends on
expertsmotivation parameters. Second, it keeps track of how many projects for which each expert has
chosen to be the primary provider. Third, it depends on the total time and technology costs incurred by
each expert. Under our accounting rule, the Partnership bears all the costs, and receives all the revenues
from the Principal, so expertsnet payments are entirely determined by the sharing rule. The sum of (14)
and (15) is simply     s (C1 + C2), so it is always budget balanced as required by (7).
There are two basic components: each experts total costs, C1 and C2, and the project masses for which
experts are primary providers, M1 and M2. Expertsdecisions on time inputs have no e¤ect on M1 and M2.
However, if Expert j decides to be a primary provider, he changes both Mj and Cj .
Condition (14) asks Expert 1 to bear 1 of any of his cost C1, so he bears 1 of his time costs incurred
in Stage 4. Similarly, condition (15) asks Expert 2 to bear 2 of his time costs incurred in Stage 4. What
about Expert 2s decisions in Stage 3? According to (15), if he is the primary provider for project b, he will
raise the measure M2 by one unit, so he incurs a cost 2. Also, he will bear 2 of his technology and time
cost, but he receives (1  s) of Expert 1s time input costs. Expert 2s net payment, if he takes on project
b, is  2[c2 + t22(b)]  2 + (1   s)t12(b).
Expert 1s decisions in Stage 2 are more complicated. First, he has the option to take on project b. If
he does so, he raises the measure M1 by one, so pays 1. He also has to bear the increment in technology
and time costs C1 at rate 1. The cost C2 will also increase by Expert 2s time input, and Expert 1 receives
(2   s) of that increase. His net payment is  1[c1 + t11(b)]  1 + (2   s)t21(b).
10 = 1 +
R b2
b1
f1(c1 + t11(b)) + 1   (2   s)t21(b)gf(b)db+
R b
b2
f1t12(b)  2   (2   s)(c2 + t22(b))g f(b)db.
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Expert 1s second option is to pass on project b to Expert 2. Assume that Expert 2 will then take on
the project. Condition (14) gets Expert 1 to bear his own time cost 1t12(b), but it also gets him to receive
an amount 2 + (2   s)[c2 + t22(b)] due to Expert 2s cost and his being the primary provider. Expert 1s
net payment is  1t12(b) + 2 + (2   s)[c2 + t22(b)]. Finally, Expert 1 may just abandon the project and
nets 0.
5.2 Gatekeeper Expert 1 and implementation
We have just laid out the expertsnet payment consequences in each stage. Now we derive the subgame-
perfect equilibria. In Stage 4, only time inputs are to be decided on any project b when an expert has chosen
to be a primary provider. We have seen that the sharing rule makes Expert i bear i of his time cost.
Because Expert i gets a motivational benet at i of the output, he internalizes the social cost and benet.
The following result is immediate.
Lemma 4 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 4, each expert chooses the rst-best time inputs tij(b)
for every project b when Expert j is the primary provider, i; j = 1; 2.
Lemma 4 pins down the values of tij(b) in the two expertscontinuation equilibrium payo¤s in Stage 4.
It also implies that the rst best is implemented when there are 1 and 2 so that Experts 1 and 2 take on
projects as primary providers if and only if b1  b < b2 and b  b2, respectively.
In Stage 3, Expert 2 decides whether to become a primary provider or abandon the projects that Expert
1 has chosen to pass on. If Expert 2 chooses to abandon a project, his incremental payo¤ is zero. If Expert
2 chooses to be the primary provider for project b, he assumes the continuation equilibrium in Lemma 4.
The net payment can be obtained from Subsection 5.1. Together with the motivation benet, Expert 2s
payo¤ will be 2[R2(t12(b); t

22(b))b  c2   t22(b)]  2 + (1   s)t12(b). We use the value of 2 in (17) and
the continuation equilibrium payo¤s to show the following.
Lemma 5 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 3, Expert 2 takes on a project b as the primary
provider if and only if b  b2.
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Our choice of 2 in (17) and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s in Stage 4 simplify Expert 2s payo¤
from being the primary provider to
2[V2(b)  V2(b2)] + (1 + 2   s)[t12(b)  t12(b2)]; (18)
and the steps for this expression are in the proof of the lemma. Given the sharing rule and the continuation
equilibrium in Stage 4, Expert 2 internalizes any surplus di¤erence between project b and the threshold
project b2 (the rst term), as well as any di¤erence in Expert 1s time input costs (the second term).
Because both V2 and t12 are increasing in b and s
 = 1 +2, Expert 2s decision in Stage 3 will implement
the rst best for all projects with benet parameters above b2.
In Stage 2, Expert 1 chooses between abandoning a project, becoming the primary provider, and pass-
ing it on. Then Expert 2s decision will result in a continuation equilibrium described by Lemma 5 in
Stage 3, and then Lemma 4 in Stage 4. First, if Expert 1 chooses to take on project b, his payo¤ is
1 [R1(t

11(b); t

21(b))b  c1   t11(b)]  1 + (2   s)t21(b), which is the motivation benet plus the net pay-
ment specied in Subsection 5.1. Second, if Expert 1 passes the project on to Expert 2, then, according to
Lemma 5, Expert 2 will abandon it if b < b2, but will provide service otherwise. Expert 1s payo¤ when
b > b2 is 1 [R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  t12(b)] + 2 + (2   s) [t22(b) + c2], where, again, we have added the mo-
tivation benet to the net payment described in Subsection 5.1. We use the values of 1 in (16), 2 in (17)
and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s to show the following.
Lemma 6 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 2, Expert 1 serves project b as the primary provider
if and only if b1  b < b2 and passes on project b to Expert 2 if and only if b2  b  b.
We use 1 in (16) and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s in Stage 4 to simplify Expert 1s payo¤ from
being the primary provider to
1 [R1(t

11(b); t

21(b))b  c1   t11(b)]  1 + (2   s)t21(b)
= 1V1(b) + (1 + 2   s)(t21(b)  t21(b1)); (19)
where the steps for the equality are spelled out in the proof of the lemma. Payo¤ (19) says that Expert 1
fully internalizes the surplus from project b and the di¤erence in Expert 2s time costs for project b and the
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Figure 2: Gatekeeper Expert 1s payo¤s in Stage 2
cuto¤ project b1 when Expert 1 is the primary provider. Because V1(b

1) = 0, and V1, t

21 are increasing in
b, Expert 1s interest aligns with the rst best for all projects with indexes below b2.
Next, we use 2 in (17) and the continuation equilibrium in Stage 3 to simplify Expert 1s equilibrium
payo¤ if he passes on a project b > b2 to Expert 2:
1 [R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  t12(b)] + (2   s) [t22(b) + c2] + 2
= 1V2(b) + (1 + 2   s)[t12(b2) + t22(b) + c2] + 2V2(b2) (20)
> 1V1(b) + (1 + 2   s)(t21(b)  t21(b1));
where the steps for the equality are in the proof. Here, the choice of 2 and the more productive Expert 2
actually let Expert 1 gain more than what he can internalize from being the primary provider. For projects
b > b2, our choice of 2 in (17) aligns both Expert 1s incentive to pass on a project and Expert 2s incentive
to be primary provider. In Figure 2, we plot Expert 1s equilibrium payo¤s in (19) for being the primary
provider for all projects in the lower graph, and Expert 1s equilibrium payo¤s in (20) when Expert 2 is the
primary provider for projects b > b2 in the upper graph.
Our preceding three lemmas completely characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in the
subgame dened by gatekeeper Expert 1 and the sharing rule in (14) to (17). Projects b < b1 will be
abandoned by either expert. Projects with b between b1 and b

2 will be served by Expert 1 (and rejected by
21
Expert 2). Projects with b higher than b2 will be served by Expert 2 (and also served by Expert 1 o¤ the
equilibrium path). First-best time inputs will be supplied to those projects with a primary provider. Any
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is rst best. Finally, recall that we have used a constant  in the
denition of the sharing rule. Its value is dened in footnote 10, and makes sure that in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium, each expert earns the minimum prot. The three lemmas together say that gatekeeper Expert
1 and the sharing rule implement the allocation that maximizes Partnership surplus in any continuation
equilibrium.11 Hence, it is a best response for the Partnership to use Expert 1 as a gatekeeper and the
sharing rule in (14) to (17). We conclude by stating the result formally.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the Principal o¤ers the contract ( ; s). In the extensive form in Subsection
3.2, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the Partnership chooses Expert 1 as the gatekeeper and the
budget-balanced sharing rule dened by (14) to (17), and the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is rst best,
with Expert 1s equilibrium prot being 1, and Expert 2s equilibrium prot being 2. Furthermore, because
this equilibrium outcome also maximizes Partnership surplus, every subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome
must be rst best.
5.3 Gatekeeper Expert 2 and sharing rule
What about subgames in which Expert 2 is the gatekeeper? It turns out that the rst best may be a
continuation equilibrium when the Principal o¤ers the same contract ( ; s) under some conditions. In
these cases, there are multiple subgame-perfect equilibria.
Lemma 7 Suppose that the Principal o¤ers the contract ( ; s). If Expert 2 is the gatekeeper and t12(b) 
t11(b) is nondecreasing in b, there is a sharing rule so that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is the
rst best with each expert making his minimum prot.
Any budget-balanced, quasi-linear sharing rule must take the form in (14) and (15). For rst-best time
inputs, each expert must internalize the time cost and motivational benet. Experts 1 and 2 have motivation
11The lemmas do not say that the continuation equilibrium must be unique. Projects with benet indexes below b1
must be rejected, but either expert will do that. Rather trivial multiple equilibria exist: in one equilibrium, Expert
1 rejects those projects; in another, Expert 2 does.
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Figure 3: Gatekeeper Expert 2s payo¤ in Stage 2
parameters 1 and 2, so Expert 1 should bear 1 of the cost C1 in (14), and Expert 2 should bear 2 of
the cost C2 in (15). The other terms that involve costs C1 and C2 in (14) and (15) are there to maintain
budget balance. Then there remain only two other instruments for other incentives, namely 1 and 2, and
the terms involving project masses M1 and M2 must also maintain budget balance. Proposition 2 says that
such instruments, 1 and 2, are su¢ cient for rst-best implementation when Expert 1 is the gatekeeper.
In fact, the piece rate 2 in (17) ensures that Expert 2 will only provide service to projects b > b

2. Hence,
Expert 1s decision is nontrivial only for projects b > b2.
The same consideration does not hold when Expert 2 is the gatekeeper. For rst-best implementation,
Expert 1 must be willing to be the primary provider for projects with b between b1 and b

2. Because Expert
1s payo¤ is monotone increasing in b, Expert 1 must also be willing to be the primary provider for projects
b > b2. Therefore, Expert 2, as a gatekeeper, faces a nontrivial decision for a wider range of projects, all
those with benet indexes between b1 and b.
When t12(b)   t11(b) is nondecreasing in b, Expert 2s gain from taking on a project against passing on
the project is increasing in b and the rst best can be implemented. Here, the comparison between Expert
2s payo¤s from taking on project b as a primary provider and passing on the project is illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 3. Nevertheless, when t12(b)  t11(b) is decreasing in b, Expert 2s gain from being a primary
provider for a project against passing it on may not be monotone increasing. As a result, Expert 2 may
choose to be the primary provider for projects with very high and very low benets, but pass on projects
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with intermediate benets. This possibility is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3. In this case, the rst
best is not a continuation equilibrium.
6 Seniority Partnerships
We have used the Partnership as a ctitious player to represent the charter and governance set up by the
experts when they form the organization. The rst-best implementation results, however, are more general,
and apply to alternate governance forms. Now we consider two other partnership designs. In each, one
expert becomes the Senior Partner, whereas the other is the Junior Partner. (We will use the term General
Partnership to refer to the Partnership-as-a-ctitious-player organization.)
The Senior Partner and the Junior Partner are joint owners, and they continue to split revenues and costs
according to a sharing rule. However, the Senior Partner decides on accepting and rejecting the Principals
contract, the gatekeeping protocol, and the sharing rule. The Senior Partner will make these decisions based
on his own preferences (instead of the aggregated preferences of experts). However, we maintain the same
information structure and contractible states as in the implementation under General Partnership, so the
functional form of the sharing rule remains the same as in (14) and (15).
We study, in turn, Expert 1 as the Senior Partner, and Expert 2 as the Senior Partner. In each case, the
extensive form is identical to the one in Subsection 3.2 except that in Stage 1, the Senior Partner (rather
than the ctitious Partnership) makes all the decisions. Can the Principal entrust a Seniority Partnership
to implement the rst best? How does the seniority governance a¤ect the Principals contract, gatekeeping
protocol, and the sharing rule?
6.1 Senior Partner Expert 1
The rst best can be implemented by the following Principals cost-sharing contract (b ; bs):
b  = 1
"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
+ 1 + 2;
(21)
bs = 1:
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This new contract is obtained by replacing   1 + 2 in (10) by 1; this is the only di¤erence. The
Principal now uses the least motivated Expert 1 to construct the contract.
Given the Principals contract (b ; bs), Senior Partner Expert 1 chooses a gatekeeping protocol and a
sharing rule in Stage 1 to maximize his own payo¤ in the continuation equilibrium. As in Sections 4 and
5, we show implementation in two steps. First, we consider the surplus that Expert 1 can achieve if he can
dictate an allocation. We obtain a result analogous to Proposition 1: given the Principals contract in (21),
Senior Partner Expert 1s payo¤ is maximized by the rst best, with both experts making the minimum
prots. Second, we show that Expert 1 can implement the rst best in the extensive form game by choosing
a gatekeeper and a sharing rule in Stage 1.
When Senior Partner Expert 1 can dictate an allocation, the technology cost and time inputs that
Expert 2 is made to incur may be transferred to Expert 1. We assume, however, that Expert 2s motivation
benet remains private, and nontransferable. Hence, if Expert 1 lets Expert j be the primary provider for
project b, Expert 1s payo¤, net of any xed payment to Expert 2, is 1Rj(t1j ; t2j)b bs(cj+t1j+t2j) for time
inputs t1j and t2j . Let W 1j (b; 1; bs)  maxt1j ;t2j 1Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  bs(cj + t1j + t2j); this is Expert 1s payo¤ from
optimal time inputs when he chooses Expert j to be the primary provider, j = 1; 2. For any project b, Expert
1s surplus is maxf0;W 11 (b; 1; bs);W 12 (b; 1; bs)g, net of any xed payment. Expert 1s surplus is isomorphic
to the Partnership surplus in (8), which has the form maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g (with  = 1 +2), so
Expert 1 is like a General Partnership with (total) motivation parameter 1. The following lemma follows
from an adaptation of results in Section 4.
Lemma 8 Suppose that Expert 1 chooses an allocation to maximize his own payo¤ subject to minimum
prots. If the Principal o¤ers the contract (b ; bs) in Stage 0, Expert 1 of any degree of motivation maximizes
his payo¤ by choosing the rst best.
Lemma 8 has the same logic as Lemmas 2 and 3 (which prove Proposition 1). If Senior Partner Expert 1
could dictate all decisions, he would internalize Expert 2s technology costs and time inputs, and would pay
Expert 2 the minimum prot. Hence, Senior Partner Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1 is like a General
Partnership with motivation parameter  = 1+ 0. But now the contract (b ; bs) from the Principal is simply
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adjusting for this lower degree of motivation from ( ; s), the one in (10). The rst best maximizes the least
motivated Expert 1s surplus, and his minimum-prot constraint just binds. The binding minimum-prot
constraint deters a more motivated Expert 1 from rendering services more generous than the rst best.
Can Expert 1 choose a gatekeeping protocol and design a corresponding sharing rule in Stage 1 to
implement the rst best? The following proposition gives an a¢ rmative answer.
Proposition 3 Given the Principals contract (b ; bs), there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which Senior
Partner Expert 1 works as the gatekeeper and sets the following sharing rule
1(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) =   1C1 + 2C2   bsC2   1M1 + 2M2 (22)
2(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) = b   + 1C1   bsC1   2C2 + 1M1   2M2; (23)
where
1  (1 + 2   bs)t21(b1) (24)
2  2V2(b2) + (1 + 2   bs)t12(b2); (25)
for some constant . Any subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is rst best, and gives each expert his
minimum prot.
The sharing rule for implementation is essentially identical to the one in Subsection 5.1. There, the
General Partnership uses the sharing rule (14) to (17) in response to the Principals contract ( ; s). The
piece rates 1 and 2 and the transfer  are functions of the cost share s
 = 1 +2. When Expert 1 is the
Senior Partner, the Principal adjusts the cost share to bs = 1. In response, Expert 1 changes the sharing
rule by replacing s in (14) to (17) by bs. Because the sharing rule in (22) to (25) is essentially the same
as (14) to (17), the two expertsincentives in Stages 3 and 4 remain unchanged. The equilibrium outcome
must be the rst-best allocation.
For brevity, we do not study those equilibria in which Senior Partner Expert 1 assigns Expert 2 as
the gatekeeper. From Lemma 7, the equilibrium outcome may not always be the rst best in the general
Partnership. We expect the same di¢ culty when Expert 1 is the Senior Partner.
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6.2 Senior Partner Expert 2
The case of Expert 2 being the Senior Partner works in the same logic. We simply reverse the expertsroles
in the previous subsection. The analysis works in an analogous way. First, the Principal replaces 1 in
the contract (b ; bs) in (21) by 2, the lowest of Expert 2s degrees of motivation. Lemma 8 directly applies.
Senior Partner Expert 2 of any degree of motivation chooses the rst best to maximize his payo¤ and the
two experts make their minimum prots. Implementation remains the same as when Expert 1 is the Senior
Partner. Expert 2 chooses Expert 1 as the gatekeeper, switches the value of bs in the sharing rule (22) to
(25) from 1 to 2, and adjusts the lump sum transfers accordingly.
6.3 Robust Principals contract
We have shown that the rst best can be implemented under either Expert 1 or Expert 2 Seniority Partner-
ships. The Principal has used di¤erent contracts for the rst-best implementation. In fact, we now describe
an even stronger result: a single Principals contract can implement the rst best whether experts form a
General Partnership or a Seniority Partnership.
We have assumed that Expert is motivation parameter is drawn from support [i; i], a strictly positive
interval. Suppose that the Principal, perhaps overly conservatively, thought that the support was really
[0i; i], with 0 < 
0
i < i. That is, the Principal believed that the least motivated expert was less generous
than Expert i. The Principal would have constructed the contracts using the lower motivation parameters,
in General and Seniority Partnerships. However, Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold! The reason is
that for any General and Seniority Partnerships having larger motivation parameters, their minimum-prot
constraints bind, and maximize surpluses by the rst-best allocation. The following is immediate.
Proposition 4 If the Principal o¤ers the contract
e  = e"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
+ 1 + 2;
(26)
es = e;
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where 0 < e < minf1; 2g < 1 + 2 = , any of the General or Senior Partnerships with motivation
higher than e makes the minimum prots and implements the rst best as a subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome.
The Proposition implies a discontinuity at  = 0. That is, if the support of an experts motivation
parameter is [0; j ], a contract that sets es = 0 in (26) cannot achieve the rst best. At es = 0 in (26), experts
are just paid their minimum prots as lump sums, but do not bear any costs. The Partnership surplus in
(8) now becomes Wj(b; ; 0)  max
tij ;t2j
Rj(t1j ; t2j)b. Clearly, the Partnership surplus is no longer isomorphic
to the rst-best surplus. However, for any e > 0, the isomorphism in (9) holds. A Partnership with any
e > 0 still internalizes the rst-best surplus multiplied by e > 0; the minimum-prot constraint still deters
them from deviating from the rst best. The Principal can get arbitrarily close to the rst best by setting a
positive es arbitrarily close to 0. Those Partnerships with  < es will not implement the rst best.12 However,
Proposition 4 does imply that our results are robust. One simple contract can implement (or approximately
implement) the rst best at General and Seniority Partnerships. The Principal does not have to know the
precise organization form.
7 Conclusion
We show how a Principal can successfully delegate project production decisions to experts who operate in a
Partnership. Despite the lack of project information and expertspreferences, the Principal uses a single cost
share contract for the delegation. Our theory is predicated on how the Partnership is assumed to operate.
First, within the Partnership, experts share information about projects and their own preferences. Second,
the Partnership can set up a sharing rule that is based on each experts individual time inputs and technology
choices. Third, the Partnership can set up a gatekeeping protocol to structure technology decision priorities.
The Principals contract is contingent on the Partnerships total production cost. In fact, the Principal
keeps track of nothing about each individual experts technology and time-input choices. Moreover, the
12The discontinuity is reminiscient of the classic approximate rst-best result of Mirrleesmoral hazard model
(Mirrlees, 1999). There the Principal can induce a costly e¤ort by a scheme that almost always fully insures the
Agent. But full insurance will only implement the lowest e¤ort.
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contracts reimbursement rate only depends on the preference of the least motivated Partnership. So, the
Principal does not need to know expertsmotivation distribution. The Partnership sharing rule adjusts for
di¤erences in expertspreferences. Also, the Partnerships weakly prefers to give technology-choice priority
to the low-cost-low-productivity Expert 1. This gatekeeping protocol generalist physician as gatekeeper
referring to specialist physician is commonly observed in the health care market.
Clearly, many extensions of our model are possible. An obvious one concerns projects that require more
than two experts. In this case, Partnerships will also have more than two experts. The rst best can be
straightforwardly dened. However, gatekeeping can take place in a hierarchical fashion, and one expert can
pass on a project either up or down the hierarchy. Sharing rules must also be enriched. Our preliminary
work suggests a monotonicity result: e¢ ciency can be achieved when hierarchical priority starts from the
least-cost-least-productive expert and goes up.
We have assumed that experts reservation utilities are not much higher than their minimum prots,
so the minimum-prot constraint is the participation constraint. This also means that experts outside
options are independent of their types, a common assumption in agency models. The experience in the
extant agency literature is that relaxing this assumption to allow type-dependent reservation utilities tends
to be di¢ cult, but is clearly of interest. Finally, experts play a game of complete information within
the Partnership (although they do choose time inputs simultaneously). Any incomplete information about
motivation benets would necessarily complicate the model. Again, this possible exploration is of interest
but for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Dene a function y : <2+[b; b]f1; 2g ! <+ by y(t1; t2; b; j) = Rj(t1; t2)b cj t1 t2.
First, by (4), the function y is supermodular in (t1; t2). Second, consider (t01; t
0
2) and (t1; t2) with (t
0
1; t
0
2) 
(t1; t2) and (t01; t
0
2) 6= (t1; t2), and the di¤erence y(t01; t02; b; j)   y(t1; t2; b; j) = [Rj(t01; t02)b  cj   t01   t02]  
[Rj(t1; t2)b  cj   t1   t2]. Clearly, the di¤erence is increasing in b. The di¤erence is also increasing in
j because b [R2(t01; t
0
2) R2(t1; t2)] > b [R1(t01; t02) R1(t1; t2)] by (5). We can now apply Theorem 5 in
Milgrom and Shannon (1994, p.164). The optimal times tij(b) are increasing in b and satisfy t

i1(b) < t

i2(b),
i = 1; 2.
By the envelope theorem, we have
dVj(b)
db
= Rj(t

1j(b); t

2j(b)) > 0. By (3) and the rst part of the lemma,
we have R1(t1; t2) < R2(t1; t2) and ti1(b) < t

i2(b), i = 1; 2. Therefore,
R1(t

11(b); t

21(b)) < R2(t

11(b); t

21(b)) < R2(t

12(b); t

22(b)), hence V
0
1(b) < V
0
2(b).
The convexity of Vj follows from the positive partial derivatives of Rj and the optimal times tij(b) increasing
in b.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, we ignore the minimum-prot constraint for Partnership . By (8), the
unconstrained maximization of (11) yields the surplus maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g by pointwise opti-
mization at b. By (9), we have
maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g = max
n
0; sV1
h 
s
i
b

; sV2
h 
s
i
b
o
= maxf0; sV1 (b) ; sV2 (b)g = smaxf0; V1 (b) ; V2 (b)g:
We conclude that Partnership  chooses the rst best for the unconstrained maximization of (11).
It remains to show that the omitted minimum-prot constraint is satised. Partnership s total cost is
s
"Z b
b
f1(b) [c1 + t11(b) + t21(b)] + 2(b) [c2 + t12(b) + t22(b)]g f(b)db
#
= s
"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
:
According to the contract ( ; s), this total cost is completely reimbursed, so the Partnership nets 1 + 2.
We conclude that the minimum-prot constraint is satised.
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Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose not; that is, suppose that the minimum-prot constraint for Partnership
 >  does not bind. Partnership  >  then chooses an allocation to solve the unconstrained maximization
of (11). Using pointwise optimization, we have the maximum surplus at project b given by
maxf0;W1(b; ; s);W2(b; ; s)g = max
n
0; sV1
h 
s
i
b

; sV2
h 
s
i
b
o
= max

0; sV1




b

; sV2




b

= smax

0; V1




b

; V2




b

:
Recall the denitions of Vj and tij in (1) and (2). By Lemma 1, t

ij is increasing in b, so t

ij




b

>
tij(b) because   1 + 2 >   1 + 2. Furthermore, again from Lemma 1, 0 < V 01(b) < V 02(b).
Therefore, if at b, we have 0  V1(b), we also have 0 < V1




b

. This means that Partnership  must
provide service to more projects than in the rst best. Also, if at b, we have V1(b)  V2(b), we also have
V1




b

< V2




b

. Expert 2 must be the primary provider for more projects than the rst best.
The total cost incurred by Partnership  must be strictly more than the cost at rst best
s
"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
:
Therefore, the prot it earns from contract ( ; s) is less than 1+2, which is a contradiction. We conclude
that the minimum-prot constraint (12) binds.
Proof of Lemma 4: Consider project b and suppose that Expert j is the primary provider. From the
discussion in Subsection 5.1, in Stage 4, parts of expertspayo¤s related to time inputs are 1[Rj(t1j ; t2j)b 
t1j ] and 2[Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  t2j ]. The equilibrium time inputs (bt1j(b);bt2j(b)) are mutual best responses:
bt1j(b) = max
t1j
1[Rj(t1j ;bt2j(b))b  t1j ] and bt2j(b) = max
t2j
2[Rj(bt1j(b); t2j)b  t2j ]: (27)
Clearly, (bt1j(b);bt2j(b)) are best responses if and only if they solve
max
t1j ;t2j
Rj(t1j ; t2j)b  t1j   t2j   cj ;
which is the denition of the rst-best time inputs in (2).
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Proof of Lemma 5: Expert 2s equilibrium payo¤ from taking on project b is
2[R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  c2   t22(b)]  2 + (1   s)t12(b)
= 2[R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  c2   t22(b)] + (1   s)t12(b)  2V2(b2)  (1 + 2   s)t12(b2)
= 2[R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  c2   t12(b)  t22(b)] + (1 + 2   s)t12(b)  2V2(b2)  (1 + 2   s)t12(b2);
where the rst equality follows from the denition of 2 in (17), and the second is due to the term 2t

12(b)
being added and subtracted. Next, we use the denition of V2 in (1) to simplify the above to
2[V2(b)  V2(b2)] + (1 + 2   s)[t12(b)  t12(b2)]:
By the monotonicity of V2 and t12 in b in Lemma 1, and the identity s
  1 + 2, the above is positive if
and only if b  b2. We conclude that Expert 2 chooses to be a primary provider if and only if b  b2.
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose Expert 1 has project b. If he decides to be primary provider, his payo¤ is
1 [R1(t

11(b); t

21(b))b  c1   t11(b)]  1 + (2   s)t21(b)
= 1 [R1(t

11(b); t

21(b))b  c1   t11(b)  t21(b)]  1 + (1 + 2   s)t21(b)
= 1V1(b) + (1 + 2   s)(t21(b)  t21(b1));
where the rst equality follows from adding and subtracting t21(b), and where the second equality follows from
our choice of 1 in (16). Clearly, from Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, we have V1(b) > 0 and t

21(b) t21(b1) > 0
if and only if b > b1. In the continuation equilibrium in Lemma 5, Expert 2 will abandon projects with
indexes below b2. It follows that for any b < b

2, Expert 1s best response is that in the lemma.
Next, if b > b2 and he passes the project on to Expert 2. According to Lemma 5, Expert 2 will be
primary provider, so Expert 1s payo¤ is
1 [R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  t12(b)] + (2   s) [t22(b) + c2] + 2
= 1 [R2(t

12(b); t

22(b))b  t12(b)  t22(b)  c2] + (1 + 2   s) [t22(b) + c2] + 2
= 1V2(b) + (1 + 2   s)[t12(b2) + t22(b) + c2] + 2V2(b2):
This payo¤ is strictly bigger than 1V1(b) + (1 +2  s)[t21(b)  t21(b1)] for b > b2, Expert 1s payo¤ from
being primary provider (because V2(b) > V1(b), and t22(b) > t

21(b)). We conclude that Expert 1 strictly
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prefers to pass on any project b > b2 to Expert 2. Expert 1s best response for project b > b

2 is as described
in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7: We prove the lemma by showing that a sharing rule can implement the rst best
in the new extensive-form game if t12(b)  t11(b) is nondecreasing in b. The sharing rule is
e1(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) = e  1C1 + (2   s)C2   e1M1 + e2M2 (28)
e2(M1;M2; C1; C2;1; 2) =     e + (1   s)C1   2C2 + e1M1   e2M2; (29)
where
e1   (1 + 2   s)[t11(b1) + c1] (30)
e2  (1 + 2   s)[t12(b2)  t11(b2) + t11(b1)] (31)
e  1 + Z b2
b1
f1(c1 + t11(b)) + e1   (2   s)t21(b)gf(b)db
+
Z b
b2
f1t12(b)  e2   (2   s)(c2 + t22(b))g f(b)db: (32)
First, observe that (28), (29) are identical to (14), (15) except for the values of piece rates e1, e2 and
constant e. Hence, (28) and (29) must also be budget-balanced. Lemma 4 also straightforwardly applies to
Stage 4 of the new extensive-form game. Given (28) and (29), each expert must choose the rst-best time
inputs tij(b) for every project b.
Now consider Expert 1s decisions in Stage 3. Based on (28), Expert 1s incremental payo¤ from serving
project b he has received from Expert 2 is
eu1(b)  1R1(t11(b); t21(b))b  1(c1 + t11(b)) + (2   s)t21(b)  e1
= 1V1(b) + (1 + 2   s)t21(b)  e1: (33)
By Lemma 1, both V1(b) and t21(b) are increasing in b. Now substitute the denition of e1 in (30) into (33)
and evaluate eu1(b) at b1, we have eu1(b1) > 0. Because eu1(b) is continuous and increasing in b, there exists a
cuto¤ value eb1 < b1 such that eu1(b)  0 if and only if b  eb1.
In Stage 2, Expert 2 chooses among abandoning a project, becoming the primary provider for the project,
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and passing on the project to Expert 1. By (29), Expert 2s incremental gain from taking on project b is
eu2(b)  2R2(t12(b); t22(b))b  2(t22(b) + c2) + (1   s)t12(b)  e2
= 2V2(b) + (1 + 2   s)t12(b)  e2; (34)
whereas his incremental gain from passing on a project to Expert 1 is
euP2 (b)  2R1(t11(b); t21(b))b  2t21(b) + (1   s)(t11(b) + c1) + e1
= 2V1(b) + (1 + 2   s)(c1 + t11(b)) + e1 (35)
if b  eb1, and euP2 (b) = 0 if b < eb1. By Lemma 1, V2(b), t12(b), V1(b), and t11(b) are increasing in b, so both
(34) and (35) are increasing in b.
We rst consider euP2 (b). Substitute e1 dened in (30) into (35) and evaluate euP2 (b) at b1, we have
euP2 (b1) = 0 because V1(b1) = 0 by Assumption 1. We conclude that euP2 (b) > 0 if b > eb1 and euP2 (b) = 0 if
b  eb1.
We next compare eu2(b) with euP2 (b). For each project b  eb1, the di¤erence between eu2(b) and euP2 (b) is
eu2(b)  eu2(b)  euP2 (b)
= 2 (V2(b)  V1(b)) + (1 + 2   s)(t12(b)  t11(b)  c1)  e1   e2
= 2 (V2(b)  V1(b)) + (1 + 2   s)[ft12(b)  t11(b)g   ft12(b2)  t11(b2)g]: (36)
Because V2(b2) = V1(b

2) by Assumption 1, we have eu2(b2) = 0. Di¤erentiating (36) with respective to b
yields
@eu2(b)
@b
= 2 (V
0
2(b)  V 01(b)) + (1 + 2   s)
@
@b
[t12(b)  t11(b)]:
By Lemma 1, we have V 02(b)  V 01(b) > 0. If t12(b)  t11(b) is nondecreasing in b, eu2(b) must be increasing
in b for b  eb1.
Now suppose that t12(b)  t11(b) is nondecreasing in b. We have
maxfeu2(b); euP2 (b); 0g =
8>>>><>>>>:
eu2(b) if b2  b  b
euP2 (b) if b1  b < b2
0 if b  b < b1
:
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Hence, Expert 2 maximizes his payo¤ by abandoning a project if and only if b < b1, passing on a project to
Expert 1 if and only if b1  b < b2, and leading the project as the primary provider if and only if b2  b.
The rst best is a continuation equilibrium. Finally, it is easy to verify that given the value of e in (32),
the two experts make the minimum prots by implementing the rst best.
Proof of Lemma 8: We let Expert 1 be responsible for technology cost and time input costs incurred
by Expert 2, and pay a lump sum equal to 2 to satisfy Expert 2s minimum-prot constraint. Given the
contract (b ; bs), Expert 1s payo¤ from assigning Expert j, j = 1; 2, as the primary provider for project b is
W 1j (b; 1; bs) = W1(b; 1 + 0; bs)
= bsVj h1bs i b ;
where the rst equality follows from (8) and the second equality follows from (9).
By the same argument in the proof of Lemma 2, Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1, the least
motivated Senior Partner, maximizes his payo¤by choosing the rst-best allocation. Moreover, his minimum-
prot constraint just binds,
b   bs"Z b2
b1
fc1 + t11(b) + t21(b)g f(b)db+
Z b
b2
fc2 + t12(b) + t22(b)g f(b)db
#
  2 = 1:
Consider an Expert 1 who is more motivated, 1 > 1. Replacing s
 and 1 + 2 in the proof for Lemma 3
by bs and 1, respectively, we see that Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1 must have a binding minimum-
prot constraint. The modied Lemmas 2 and 3 imply a modied Proposition 1, in which contract ( ; s)
is replaced by (b ; bs), and any degree of motivation   1 + 2 is replaced by 1. This is the statement of
the lemma.
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